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Abstract
This paper argues that same-sex marriage has been le-
galized through a problematic process of drawing paral-
lels between gay and straight couples, ultimately creat-
ing new tensions between the conjugal and non-conju-
gal. As a result, the Canadian state’s continued reliance 
on conjugality as the primary non-blood relationship 
has implications for how we understand family. Us-
ing a sexual citizenship framework, this paper aims to 
conceptualize a direction for the Canadian state with 
respect to relationship recognition and to establish a 
space for discussing alternative categories of adult per-
sonal relationships.
Résumé 
Cet article fait valoir que le mariage entre personnes 
de même sexe a été légalisé par le biais d’un processus 
problématique qui consiste à établir des parallèles 
entre les couples homosexuels et hétérosexuels, ce qui 
finit par causer de nouvelles tensions entre le conjugal 
et le non-conjugal. Par conséquent, le fait que l’État 
canadien continue de considérer la conjugalité comme 
principale relation sans lien de sang a des répercussions 
sur notre compréhension du concept de la famille. Cet 
article utilise un cadre de citoyenneté sexuelle pour 
conceptualiser une orientation pour l’État canadien en 
ce qui a trait à la reconnaissance des relations et pour 
créer un contexte de discussion d’autres catégories de 
relations personnelles entre adultes.
On 24 July 2005, the Civil Marriage Act was 
passed in the Canadian House of Commons, making 
Canada the fourth country in the world to recognize 
same-sex marriage. The Act was a culmination of legal, 
social, and political efforts, which resulted in a signifi-
cant transformation in Canadian law with respect to re-
lationship recognition. While common-law status was 
already available, the legalization of same-sex marriage 
not only legitimized homosexual conjugality in terms 
of state recognition through the provision of rights and 
responsibilities previously limited to heterosexual cou-
ples, but it also made the gendered construction of a 
relationship irrelevant. A legitimate relationship—as 
defined by the state—was no longer solely available to 
cross-sex participants. Ultimately the Act challenged 
the heterosexual marriage model by providing same-sex 
couples the right to have their relationships recognized 
by the Canadian state. Or at least some same-sex rela-
tionships. While unquestionably progressive, critical le-
gal and queer theorists take issue with the ascription of 
the opposite-sex marriage model to same-sex couples, 
particularly with respect to the implications this model 
holds for family diversity. A major consequence is that 
only one version of the “queer family” is recognized. As 
a result, a hierarchy of appropriate homosexual conduct 
is established, separating the “good” queers from the 
“bad.” For these scholars, the same-sex marriage move-
ment is guilty of reproducing the very systems of nor-
malization they claim to be disrupting, suggesting that 
“legal victories are never only legal victories” (Cossman 
2000, 49).
 Building on these two bodies of scholarship, 
the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the 
Canadian state’s reliance on conjugality as the primary 
non-blood relationship has implications for how we un-
derstand family. Put differently, it argues that although 
same-sex marriage is recognized, this has occurred 
through a problematic process of drawing parallels be-
tween gay and straight couples, consequently creating 
new divides between the conjugal and non-conjugal. So 
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long as conjugality remains the root of relationship rec-
ognition in Canada, marriage and marriage-like rela-
tionships will remain the only state-recognized options 
for adult personal relationships. Ultimately, this paper 
questions the current Canadian legal framework’s de-
pendency on conjugality as the key indicator of a legit-
imate relationship and accordingly, its capacity to ac-
commodate for family diversity. 
 The paper proceeds in three parts: first, I situate 
my paper within a sexual citizenship framework, exam-
ining how same-sex marriage was framed as a claim for 
citizenship; second, I examine several key cases involv-
ing relationship recognition up to and including the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. This analysis high-
lights the role conjugality plays within the current legal 
framework and the resulting similarities drawn between 
homosexual and heterosexual couples. Finally, I explore 
three major tensions that are produced and reproduced 
as a result of conjugality taking primacy in Canadian 
law and policy. In doing so, this paper aims to encour-
age discussions about non-traditional families and the 
role of the Canadian state post-same-sex marriage.
Marriage and Citizenship
 Sexual citizenship is not a new concept, nor is 
citizenship a separate entity incorporated into sexual 
politics—“all citizenship is sexual citizenship, as citi-
zenship is inseparable from identity, and sexuality is 
central to identity” (Bell and Binnie 2000, 33). The idea 
is that if citizenship is grounded in ideals of the fami-
ly, citizens are constantly being sexed. By establishing 
specific conditions through this process of sexing, in-
dividuals are categorized as “good” and “bad” citizens. 
These categories are identified through understandings 
of sexual responsibility; those who are responsible in 
their sexual endeavours represent ideal sexual citizens. 
This framework suggests that the state privileges certain 
sexual relationships in order to enforce citizenship as 
defined through sexual practice. Conjugality becomes 
a way in which the “responsible” are separated from 
the “irresponsible.” A sexual citizenship framework 
therefore poses a new approach to our understanding 
of the public/private divide: “The sexual citizen makes 
a claim to transcend the limits of the personal sphere 
by going public, but the going public is, in a necessary 
paradoxical move, about protecting the possibilities of 
private life and private choice in a more inclusive soci-
ety” (Weeks 1998, 37). Sexual citizenship claims use the 
public sphere to obtain a secure private space for the in-
dividual in question. Relationships that do not fall with-
in the parameters of what is believed to be “normal” are 
denied space.  
 This is where the push for same-sex marriage 
aligns with citizenship claims. It challenges the Cana-
dian state’s privileging of a particular sexual citizen: the 
heterosexual citizen. Throughout the same-sex marriage 
campaign, advocacy groups and litigants alike framed 
marriage as the key to gays and lesbians achieving full 
citizenship, access to marriage being the affirmation of 
their full personhood (Kelly 2011; Lahey 1999). With 
the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2005, hetero-
sexuality is no longer the standard for all forms of citi-
zenship, requiring those using this framework to ques-
tion who is today’s ideal sexual citizen and, in doing 
so, understand who is now being excluded (Cossman 
2007). Same-sex marriage has confronted the hetero-
sexual ideal of citizenship; however, it has arguably 
done so in a way that simultaneously reinforces other 
sexual ideals including heteronormativity, monogamy, 
and the focus of this paper, conjugality. Favouring con-
jugal relationships over non-conjugal relationships has 
allowed the state to extend certain same-sex couples cit-
izenship—while simultaneously excluding others—en-
forcing what Puar (2007) terms sexual exceptionalism. 
By examining the impact citizenship has on the creation 
of sexual identities post-same-sex marriage, it becomes 
clear that conjugality continues to shape who the ideal 
sexual citizen is and their relation to the state. This the-
oretical framework accomplishes the recognition of sys-
tems of power and access embedded within state-recog-
nized relationship categories. 
Legal History of Relationship Recognition in Canada
 The Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980) decision 
established what is referred to as the “functional equiv-
alence” test used to legally determine conjugality. Prior 
to this ruling, courts used the “subjective equivalence” 
test—premised on the assumption of a voluntary eco-
nomic commitment “until death do us part”—to dis-
tinguish between conjugal and non-conjugal relation-
ships (Cossman and Ryder 2001, 283). Challenging 
the definition of “spouse” in the Ontario Family Law 
Act, Tene Molodowich (applicant) sought spousal sup-
port following the termination of her longstanding, 
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non-marital, childless relationship with Lauri Penttinen 
(respondent). Up until this point, a spouse was defined 
either as a married man or woman, or an unmarried 
man or woman who had cohabited continuously for no 
less than five years. While the couple had lived together 
off and on for several years, Molodowich claimed that 
this arrangement took place with what she thought was 
the intention of a more permanent relationship. Fur-
thermore, the applicant described her relationship with 
the respondent as “spouse-like,” as it involved conjugal 
elements including cohabitation, sexual intimacy, eco-
nomic support, emotional dependency, and the divi-
sion of daily tasks (e.g. meal preparation, cleaning).  
 The Court’s response was the “functional equiv-
alence” test, which expanded the definition of conjugal-
ity to include a broader range of relationship character-
istics; conjugality would now be determined by the “ob-
jectively observable features of the relationship rather 
than the stated subjective understandings of the parties” 
(Cossman and Ryder 2001, 287). The newly adopted test 
recognized the complexity of conjugal relationships and 
proposed that a series of factors be taken into consider-
ation when attempting to assess the legitimacy of a con-
jugal relationship, ultimately recognizing that “marital 
equivalence is situated within a bundle of factors that 
together indicate the existence of an emotionally and 
economically interdependent relationship” (Cossman 
and Ryder 2001, 283). The functional equivalence test 
involved seven functional attributes perceived capable 
of capturing the level of personal commitment required 
for non-married couples to qualify as conjugal. While 
not all of these attributes need to be present in order for 
a relationship to be deemed legitimately conjugal, the 
Court must be convinced that a combination of these 
characteristics exists. These attributes consisted of the 
following:
•	 Shelter: cohabitation, sleeping 
arrangements, other roommates
•	 Services: meal preparation, chores, 
household maintenance
•	 Social: participation in community 
activities, familial interaction
•	 Societal: community perception of the 
relationship
•	 Support: financial arrangements, property
•	 Children: attitude/conduct concerning 
children
•	 Sexual/Personal Behaviour: sexual 
relations, fidelity, emotional intimacy, care 
These characteristics distinguished between the conju-
gal and consequently, the non-conjugal. This is crucial 
to our legal understanding of conjugality because these 
attributes show that conjugal relationships are mea-
sured against characteristics believed to be part of the 
ideal marriage. Conjugality thus becomes synonymous 
with marriage or, more specifically, “how judges imag-
ine marriage ought to be” (Cossman and Ryder 2001, 
290). Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980) set the tone for 
legal recognition of intimate heterosexual relationships 
in Canada by conflating cohabitation and interdepen-
dency in order to provide governments guidance when 
differentiating between legitimate (conjugal) and ille-
gitimate (non-conjugal) relationships. 
  The enactment of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in 1982 sparked a flurry of claims 
concerning the push for same-sex rights. In M. v. H. 
(1999), the Court ruled that the omission of same-sex 
couples from the Ontario Family Law Act violated the 
right to equality (s.15) on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. This case involved the termination of a ten-year 
lesbian relationship in which M. claimed the right to 
spousal support under the Act. Upon the dissolution of 
their union, M. felt she was entitled to spousal support 
because H. was receiving a higher salary. M. argued that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition 
of spouse violated s. 15 of the Charter. Cossman de-
scribes this decision as instrumental because, “for the 
first time, the Supreme Court recognized the rights of 
same-sex couples, declaring these couples to be enti-
tled to the same protections as opposite-sex couples” 
(2002, 490).  For Cossman, this was achieved because 
M. and H. were seen as cohabiting in a conjugal rela-
tionship—“The Court recognized that a same-sex cou-
ple may, after years together, be considered to be in a 
conjugal relationship and should therefore receive the 
same rights as opposite-sex couples” (2002, 490). The 
allocation of relationship rights to same-sex cohabiting 
couples was finalized with the passing of the Modern-
ization of Benefits and Obligations Act (2000).
 As debated in Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 
what separates relationships of economic interdepen-
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dency from conjugal realtionships is the assumed pres-
ence of intimacy as narrowly defined by sexual rela-
tions, fidelity, and care (Bala 2003, 94). Following the 
legalization of same-sex common-law relationships, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in Halpern v. Can-
ada (2003) that the denial of marital rights to same-sex 
couples was discriminatory because “same-sex couples 
have the same aspirations of conjugal bliss and in fact 
live a life no differently from cross-sex married couples” 
(Lee 2010, 6). Same-sex marriage was therefore a ques-
tion of equality and human dignity. In this light, one’s 
dignity is violated when “gays and lesbians are not re-
spected as being equally capable as their heterosexual 
counterparts of forming committed marital relation-
ships” (Lee 2010, 7). Decisions like Halpern v. Canada 
(2003) paved the way for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage in Canada by deeming the gendered makeup 
of a conjugal relationship irrelevant and by conveying 
the message that the denial of marriage to same-sex 
couples lacked constitutional backing. The Civil Mar-
riage Act (2005) solidified full recognition for same-sex 
conjugal relationships by acknowledging that same-sex 
couples were capable of developing intimate relation-
ships similar to those of opposite-sex couples.
The Simultaneous Deconstruction/Construction of 
Exclusion
 While the Civil Marriage Act eased certain po-
litical and social divides, it reinforced others. The re-
mainder of this paper focuses on the latter, highlighting 
several tensions inherent within a politics of relation-
ship recognition that remain intact and are arguably 
strengthened through the provision of same-sex mar-
riage rights. 
The Relationship Between Conjugality and Rights Dis-
course
 The incorporation of a rights discourse was 
arguably the consequence of the Canadian legal system 
and the strengthened position of the Surpreme Court 
through the Charter, making this  judicial forum the 
ideal arena for minority groups (Smith 2007a). Mar-
riage itself is not a right, but it became entangled in a 
discourse of equality, individual liberties, and the ca-
pacity for self-realization. This is not to suggest that 
adopting a language of rights was a poor choice or that 
the refusal of marital status to same-sex couples is not 
discriminatory. One implication of this legal strategy, 
however, is the effect rights talk has on discussions of 
conjugality. 
  The same-sex marriage debate in Canada was 
polarizing: either you were for or against state recogni-
tion of same-sex conjugality. Consequently, one’s posi-
tion on this issue was indicative of one’s stance on rights 
more broadly. Anti-same-sex marriage became synon-
ymous with anti-human rights and vice versa. Not only 
did this polarization further the divide between liber-
al and conservative groups, it also generated tensions 
within queer advocacy and legal circles as well. Criti-
cal legal and queer scholars and advocates—labelled 
the “quiet critique” by Kelly (2011) —who questioned 
the movement’s narrowed focus on marriage were not 
claiming that the language of equality was inherently 
problematic; rather, they expressed hesitations about 
relying solely on a formal equality framework that por-
trayed same-sex relationships as being “just like” oppo-
site-sex relationships. Marriage, as the primary objec-
tive, resulted in the exclusion of alternative realtionship 
forms; same-sex marriage became the sole legitimate 
option. While the effects of this will be discussed be-
low, interpreting marriage as a right presented same-sex 
marriage as either-or; a zero-sum debate about which 
rights trumped others. Absent from these discussions 
was any questioning of the very nature of marriage as 
a right: Why is marriage considered a right? Why are 
conjugal relationships privileged over other personal 
relationships? Why is conjugality the main objective 
for same-sex couples? What interest does the state have 
in preserving conjugality? These questions were posed 
by legal scholars during the same-sex marriage debates 
(Cossman and Ryder 2001; Law Commission of Canada 
2001); however, the response was that, in order for gays 
and lesbians to be full citizens, marriage must come first 
(Lahey and Alderson 2004). With the goal being conju-
gality, since conjugal relationships are the only personal 
relationships recognized by the Canadian state, mar-
riage and rights talk became logical bedfellows.
 Additionally, in terms of legal strategy, inter-
preting marriage as a right invokes the trap of equal-
ity-as-sameness. Mossop v. Canada (1993)—the first 
Supreme Court challenge for gay and lesbian relation-
ship rights that focused specifically on the allowance of 
bereavement leave for same-sex partners —provided an 
opportunity to advocate for the rights of non-tradition-
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al families more broadly. While the case was dismissed, 
Justice L’Heureux Dubé commented in her dissenting 
opinion:
Given the range of human preferences and possibilities, 
it is not unreasonable to conclude that families may take 
many forms…It is not anti-family to support protection 
for non-traditional families. The traditional family is not 
the only family form and non-traditional family forms 
may equally advance true family values (Mossop v. Can-
ada 1993).
L’Heureux Dubé’s acknowledgment of the existence of 
non-traditional families that embody similar charac-
teristics of care and interdependency inherent in the 
traditional family structure was further supported by 
the Court’s recognition, in Egan v. Canada (1995), that 
sexual orientation was a prohibited ground of discrim-
ination under s.15 of the Charter. The gay and lesbian 
relationship rights movement could have monopolized 
on this language of non-traditional families contained 
in these two decisions; however, advocates and liti-
gants alike maintained their position of formal equal-
ity. While the Court ruled in favour of the extension of 
common-law marital benefits to same-sex couples in 
M. v. H. (1999), a legal distinction remained between 
married “spouses”—a category reserved for heterosex-
ual couples—and “common-law partners”; the Modern-
ization of Benefits and Obligations Act (2000) therefore 
offered conjugal rights to same-sex couples through a 
“separate but equal” legislative framework (Kelly 2011). 
Proving that same-sex conjugal relationships were iden-
tical to opposite-sex conjugal relationships and there-
fore deserving of state recognition thus continued to 
shape the push for same-sex marriage, framed as the 
“Holy Grail” of relationship rights recognition (Boyd 
and Young 2003; Cossman 1994; Kelly 2011; Lahey 
1999; Smith 1999). 
 Marriage as the ultimate goal meant that les-
bians and gay men were framed as a minority group 
seeking access to this particular institution. As a result, 
marriage continues to be conceptualized as the “neu-
tral” norm when it comes to family formation. The con-
tinued normalization of marriage makes the pursuance 
of difference difficult in that, in order to obtain the right 
in question, one must be interpreted as worthy of that 
right. The easiest way to do so is to appear like those 
already enjoying that right, to present oneself as “nor-
mal” with respect to three primary relationship quali-
ties: monogamous conjugality, long-term relationship, 
and economic interdependency (Kelly 2011). Argu-
ments for same-sex marriage contended that same-sex 
relationships already existed in marriage-like form; 
therefore extending marriage would not drastically al-
ter either the institution of marriage or same-sex rela-
tionships more generally. This minority rights frame-
work—portraying gays and lesbians as a special “fixed” 
group in need of protection—is therefore realized at the 
expense of ignoring the assumptions that produce and 
reproduce these systems of discrimination in the first 
place (Herman 1994, 20–3; Hiebert 2002, 164-67; Smith 
1999). Additionally, the equality-as-sameness trap runs 
the risk of replicating problems inherent in opposite-sex 
marriage, particularly its patriarchal nature. Feminist 
scholars warned of the implications the extension of 
marital benefits to same-sex couples would have for les-
bian relationships, as the patriarchal family fosters and 
maintains the subordination of women (Gavigan 1993; 
Herman 1989; Majury 1994). The fear was that gender 
imbalances present in heterosexual relationships would 
be replicated in state recognized homosexual conjugal 
relationships. The reliance on rights talk—specifically 
in discussions relating to same-sex marriage—arguably 
presents limitations for future work on queer relation-
ship recognition. 
 There are, however, benefits to rights talk in 
Canada, as made evident by the legitimacy the Char-
ter has provided social-policy reform in the area of gay 
and lesbian rights (Matthews 2005). In this context, 
one could argue that the strategy of claiming rights for 
same-sex couples challenges traditional conceptualiza-
tions of the heterosexual nuclear family. The legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage presents a counterpoint to 
the assumed naturalness of the heterosexual married 
family. This potential for reform explains the support 
behind using rights talk as a strategy for rectifying so-
cial and political discrimination based on one’s sexual 
orientation (Hiebert 1993, 2002; Smith 1999). While 
the adoption of a formal equality strategy proved to 
be successful for same-sex marriage advocates and has 
arguably altered the structure of the heterosexual nucle-
ar family in certain respects, critics of this framework 
are wary of perceiving it as an end in itself, worried the 
extension of non-traditional relationship rights will no 
longer be entertained now that same-sex marriage has 
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been legalized. The insertion of conjugality into discus-
sions of rights talk has implications—both positive and 
negative—for same-sex relationships in Canada; it is 
therefore imperative that we account for these tensions 
in future conversations concerning queer relationship 
recognition post-same-sex marriage.   
Re-entrenchment of a Conjugal/Non-conjugal Dichotomy
 The institution of marriage reinforces selective 
legitimacy in that this type of relationship is viewed as 
legitimate at the expense of others. Reflecting this view, 
Warner argues that “marriage has become the central 
legitimating institution by which the state regulates 
and permeates people’s most intimate lives” (1999, 96). 
Welcoming homosexuals into the world of conjugality 
perpetuates a similar cycle of exclusion; heterosexuals 
vs. homosexuals has been replaced with conjugal vs. 
non-conjugal. This dichotomy is fueled by the power 
of sexual shame. Sex is governed through a politics of 
shame that is both explicit (laws) and implicit (silent 
inequalities, lack of public access). Cossman (2000) 
highlights this reproduction of sexual shame in her 
comparison of the Supreme Court’s ruling in M. v. H. 
(1999)  and a police raid and subsequent charging of 
36 gay men with criminal indencency at Bijou, a bath-
house-esque gay bar in Toronto, where both events 
happened in the same month. For Cossman, this illus-
trates that the gay and lesbian subject recognized by the 
Court in M. v. H. is the desexualized family subject, not 
the “erotically charged subject of the gay bars and bath 
houses who remain sexual outlaws” (2000, 54). While 
M. v. H. is considered a victory, Cossman encourages us 
to consider how these decisions contribute to the com-
plex processes of inclusion and exclusion that state rec-
ognition of intimate relationships produces. 
 Sexual shame establishes a hierarchy of “good” 
sex and “bad” sex. Conjugal couples (both homosexual 
and heterosexual) are now viewed as ideal sexual citi-
zens (Bell and Binnie 2000; Phelan 2001; Warner 1999; 
Weeks 1998). Now that the option of state-recognized 
conjugality is available to same-sex couples, those cou-
ples who opt out are labeled as sexually deviant: a sys-
tem of regulation that Duggan (2002) terms homonor-
mativity. Warner contends that the push for same-sex 
marriage goes against the principles of queer theory, 
specifically its resistance to “any attempt to make the 
norms of straight future into the standards by which 
queer life should be measured” (1999, 88). The quest for 
marital rights creates divisions within the queer rights 
movement because, instead of deconstructing what con-
stitutes “normal” sexuality, a new “sex public” is created 
at the expense of those who choose not to fit the conju-
gal ideal (Warner 1999). Simply put, same-sex marriage 
does not change the nature of sex; rather, it provides an 
opportunity to buy a membership to the married club. 
As Boyd and Young have argued, “Adopting the status 
quo in terms of the rights and responsibilities that go 
with spousal status has reinforced the existing system 
with all its problems” (2003, 771). Of course, this binary 
mode of thinking cuts both ways. While non-conjugal 
queers are labeled sexual deviants, conjugal queers are 
accused by non-conjugal queers of selling out. What 
Warner (1999) fails to recgonize is that, in his discus-
sion of “good” sex versus “bad” sex, it becomes evident 
that “good” sex means “bad” queer. Abandoning the 
theoretical foundations of queer theory for a more het-
eronormative lifestyle marks same-sex married couples 
as betrayers of the cause. Warner therefore reproduces 
dichotomies he aims to disrupt and, furthermore, high-
lights how same-sex marriage does not eliminate divi-
sions defined by sexuality, but rather creates new ones.
 It is important to note that this hierarchy of 
conjugal privilege does not solely implicate conjugal 
and non-conjugal same-sex couples. There are many 
non-traditional personal relationships—including, but 
not limited to, non-cohabiting couples, polygamous or 
multi-party families, separated families, reconstitut-
ed families, non-conjugal families, multigenerational 
families, and friendships—that are rendered invisible 
within the current system of conjugal privilege. The 
variation in our personal relationships suggests that 
family composition is not strictly defined by conjugal-
ity, but rather, relationships of care (Roseneil and Bud-
geon 2004; Smart and Neale 1999; Smart 2000; Weeks, 
Donovan, and Heaphy 2004; Weston 1991). Despite 
their supportive nature, however, familial arrangements 
that fail to qualify as conjugal exist outside the realm of 
state recognition. The upholding of a system of conjugal 
privilege therefore reinforces these sexual hierarchies, 
maintaining heteronormative assumptions and norms 
about kinship and familial networks even if no longer 
solely defined by one’s sexual orientation.
 In addition to reinforcing differences in treat-
ment between conjugal and non-conjugal couples, the 
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push for same-sex marriage had racial and class-based 
implications as well. The presentation of same-sex con-
jugal couples as “ordinary” or the same as opposite-sex 
conjugal couples reinforces systems of heteronormativ-
ity and whiteness that guide state treatment of  intimate 
relationships and family composition (Eng 2010; Lenon 
2008, 2011; Puar 2001). Racial analogies equating the 
refusal of same-sex marriage to segregation laws were 
a common feature in the advocation of same-sex mari-
tal rights; critics argued that this comparison relied on 
the assumed legal family subject being both desexual-
ized and white (Hutchinson 1997; Lenon 2011; Puar 
2007). Moreover, these analogies suggest that racism 
and homophobia are separate systems of discrimina-
tion, ultimately ignoring the intersections of race and 
sexuality. This is compounded by the fact that the face 
of the same-sex marriage movement itself lacked diver-
sity with respect to a variety of identity-based factors 
including race, class, ability, and immigration status 
(Lenon 2008, 2011), reinforcing the message that same-
sex conjugal couples (read white, economically inter-
dependent, Canadian-born citizens) are just like their 
opposite-sex counterparts. The hierarchy of “good” sex 
and “bad” sex as redefined by the allowance of same-sex 
marriage therefore cuts across additional identity-based 
lines as well, suggesting  an anti-intersectional approach 
in analyzing the implications of state relationship rec-
ognition.
 With respect to claiming gay rights, Canadian 
history demonstrates a strategy grounded in sameness; 
however, should a queer policy agenda be desirable, we 
must recognize the limitations of the current system 
to accommodate difference. This demands a need to 
recognize differences within the queer community as 
well (Smith 2007b). Therefore, challenging the Cana-
dian state’s favoring of conjugality requires recognizing 
the complexity of these new divides and avoiding the 
re-creation of either-or options with respect to relation-
ship recognition. 
The Elimination of Space for Discussing Non-Conjugal 
Relationships and State Legitimacy
 Prior to the legalization of same-sex marriage, 
the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) issued a report 
in 2001 that focused on the legal recognition of inti-
mate relationships in Canada. Critical of government 
policy, the report advocated for a more “comprehensive 
and principled approach” with respect to recognizing 
and supporting a wider range of personal relationships 
(2001, 7). The scope of intimate relationships in this 
report extended beyond common-law opposite and 
same-sex relationships to include individuals with dis-
abilities and their caregivers as well as other non-con-
jugal relationships. The report was met with resistance 
both from the government and pro-same-sex marriage 
groups, who promised that a discussion about recogniz-
ing non-conjugal relationships through policy would 
take place once marriage was achieved (Polikoff 2008). 
At the time, the fear was that too many relationship cat-
egories would scare away public support for same-sex 
marriage and marriage was a way for homosexuals to 
gain relationship recognition without fundamentally 
changing the institution of marriage itself to the same 
extent that recognizing alternative relationships would. 
Additionally, this discourse of alternative relationships 
was interpreted by some as a conservative strategy to 
avoid the legalization of same-sex marriage (Interviews, 
2010).  
 This link between the recognition of non-conju-
gality and conservative opposition to same-sex marriage 
is not without merit. Claiming this report as their theo-
retical framework, the Alberta government introduced 
the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (AIRA) in 
2003, which provided some (but not all) rights enjoyed 
by married couples to cohabiting heterosexuals and ho-
mosexuals, regardless of conjugality. Glennon (2005) 
argues that this initiative was taken in response to the 
M. v. H. (1999) decision that recognized conjugal-like 
rights for same-sex couples. The reaction was to give 
rights to all relationships in order to avoid giving “spe-
cial rights” to same-sex relationships. For Glennon, this 
reinforces marriage by limiting the use of “spouse” to 
married couples and ascribing spousal rights to a range 
of conjugal and platonic relationships with no mention 
of same-sex relationships explicitly (2005, 157). Ulti-
mately, same-sex couples became absorbed within a 
new asexual legal category and were to be treated no 
differently than roommates, siblings, etc.; the nature of 
their relationships went from same-sex to no sex (Boyd 
and Young 2003). This is not to suggest that all propos-
als of this nature are developed with the intent to block 
the provision of conjugal rights to same-sex couples; at-
tempts to deconstruct the conjugal family can be genu-
ine. What is problematic about these initiatives, though, 
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is that while they may be sincere, they also have his-
torically appealed to those who want to keep same-sex 
relationships invisible in policy.
 While the motivations behind passing legislation 
that recognizes non-conjugal relationships can arguably 
be considered a strategy to sidestep legalizing same-sex 
marriage, it is important to recognize the possibilities 
these policies present for recognition of non-conjugal 
relationships post-same-sex marriage. From this view-
point, one could argue that these acts present “a radical 
(if less threatening) challenge to the presumed natural-
ness and ensuring privilege of the heteronormative con-
jugal family” (Harder 2009, 634). With same-sex mar-
riage now legal in Canada, initial motivations behind 
policies like the AIRA and the LCC’s recommendations 
for law and policy reform are irrelevant. These initia-
tives, nonetheless, provide a starting point for discus-
sions of relationship recognition post-same-sex mar-
riage.
 Discussions of alternative relationship catego-
ries post-same-sex marriage have stalled. With the ter-
mination of the LCC and the legalization of same-sex, 
common-law, and marital relationships, the push for 
recognition of non-conjugal relationships has waned. 
This should not mean, however, that discussions of alter-
native relationship categories are off the table. In terms 
of direction, one option would be to recognize same-sex 
partners as distinct from those in other interdependent 
relationships, but still recognize others in non-conjugal 
interdependent relationships. With the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in Canada, now might be the op-
portunity to entertain such an initiative. Doing so re-
quires abandoning a rights framework for one focused 
on queer culture. The theoretical backing for this frame 
is the notion that “LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender) life constitutes a distinctive culture and 
that LGBT people have citizenship rights based on their 
belonging to a distinctive cultural community” (Smith 
2007b, 99).  By queering our understanding of family, 
we could develop a framework that recognizes kinship 
as relationships that exist beyond the conjugal couple.
 Of course, the assumption here is that individu-
als want their non-conjugal relationships recognized by 
the state. Individuals are participants in a variety of rela-
tionships from which they can walk away without con-
sequence. With state recognition comes responsibilty, 
particularly at the point of dissolution (Halley 2001). 
State recognition of non-conjugal relationships would 
submit the parties involved to similar accountabilities. 
Moreover, while all benefits wrapped up in relationship 
recognition are often perceived as positive, this is argu-
ably not the case (Boyd and Young 2003). One’s rela-
tionship status impacts access to state provided social 
security programs including welfare, student loans, and 
child assistance. This demonstrates how the extension 
of state recognition to non-conjugal relationships has 
implications with respect to how we develop and foster 
our personal relationships, an action made increasingly 
difficult with state interference. Recognition thus pro-
vides both incentives and disincentives (Halley 2001; 
Smart and Neale 1999; Smart 2000). 
 Officially extending recognition to non-conjugal 
relationships allows the state to further privatize depen-
dency, while simultaneously regulating the operation of 
these relationships in terms of defining which relation-
ships are legitimate and consequently, which ones are 
not. For many queer theorists, state interference in one’s 
intimate relationships is undesirable: “Many couples 
who choose to live their lives in different and non-con-
formist ways do not want to be the ‘conventional’ couple 
the law tries to make them be” (Phelan 2001, 158). An-
swering whether or not individuals want their non-con-
jugal relationships recognized by the state is not an easy 
feat. Collectively, these discussions highlight the com-
plexity of recognition and reinforce the point that it is 
impossible to understand one’s personal relationships 
in either-or terms. It is important to note, however, that 
when it comes to the politics of relationship recogni-
tion, ambiguity should not lead to complacency.
 When it comes to examining whether or not it 
is desirable to have the state present in all personal re-
lationships, the easy answer is this: the state is already 
present. By establishing a hierarchy of legitimate rela-
tionships through Canadian policy, the state regulates 
familial make-up by recognizing only certain personal 
relationships as legitimate, ultimately recognizing those 
in conjugal relationships as “good” sexual citizens. Both 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships are therefore 
politicized. The more difficult answer challenges the 
state’s role in relationship recognition overall. If recog-
nition gives the state power by placing non-conjugal 
relationships under the same microscope already used 
to appraise the legitimacy of conjugal relationships, one 
could argue that state recognition of non-conjugal re-
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lationships undermines the most important issue crit-
ics have with respect to state privileging of conjugali-
ty—the idea that the state should have no place in one’s 
personal relationships (Fineman 2006; Lyndon-Shanley 
2004; Stevens 1999). If the issue is state intrusion in 
the  private details of  people’s  lives, then enhancing 
state power through a policy framework that recognizes 
non-conjugal relationships is contradictory. Therefore, 
instead of providing recognition to non-conjugal rela-
tionships, conjugality as a marker for state recognition 
could be eliminated altogether. 
 Many scholars have argued that so long as con-
jugality remains an option, there will always be rela-
tionship inequality (Metz 2010; Stevens 1999; Warner 
1999). The replacement of conjugality with a contract 
approach in which individuals have the choice to apply 
for recognition regardless of the relationship’s make-up 
would establish a system in which people who are so-
cially and economically interdependent can choose to 
be recognized by the state, regardless of whether or not 
the relationship is sexually intimate. Furthermore, such 
an approach would represent a shift away from focus-
ing on groups (conjugal, non-conjugal, homosexuals, 
heterosexuals, etc.) towards focusing on the individual, 
and would ultimately provide options for those relation-
ships seeking state recognition which fail to satisfy the 
current criteria of conjugality. Referring to this as the 
“equality of power” approach, Cooper  argues that we 
need a legal framework of recognition that “looks two 
ways—on the one hand, to individuals; on the other, 
to the social inequalities and asymmetries that pattern 
and organize our society” (2001, 99). The privileging of 
conjugality is one such process that shapes society in an 
unequal and inconsistent manner. 
 What is at stake here is not same-sex marriage, 
but rather, conjugality being the sole focus of relation-
ship recognition in Canada. This is not to suggest that 
either all relationships or no relationships should be 
recognized; this would replicate the polarizing nature 
of current arguments about relationship recognition 
this paper aims to challenge. The prescription, there-
fore, is to reinvigorate the dialogue concerning the role 
of conjugality in the politics of relationship recognition 
and to question the gap between state policy’s reliance 
on conjugality as a marker and the realities of fam-
ily formation in Canada. The adoption of a new legal 
framework capable of assessing whether adult personal 
relationships should receive recognition through state 
policy is required. Admittedly, this is not an easy task, 
as non-conjugal relationships cannot simply be added 
to existing family law; furthermore, changes in family 
law have implications for many other areas of law as 
well. However, this does not justify shying away from 
discussions which aim to deconstruct perceived qual-
itative differences between conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships. While same-sex marriage has been recog-
nized in Canada, there remains a place for queer theory 
and critical legal scholarship with respect to relation-
ship recognition. 
Conclusion
Canadian law has undergone a significant trans-
formation with respect to relationship recognition with 
the legalization of common-law and marital relation-
ships for both same-sex and cross-sex couples. While 
the state’s view of marriage has been altered, this change 
took place within an already existing framework, one 
that assumed that conjugal and conjugal-like relation-
ships are the most legitimate non-blood relationship 
category and are therefore deserving of state recogni-
tion. Despite having eased certain divides between ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals, reliance on conjugality 
has created new tensions in discussions of relationship 
recognition. So long as this relationship form is fa-
voured, other kinds of relationships are excluded and a 
specific understanding of sexual citizenship is promot-
ed by the state. By approaching conjugality as an oppor-
tunity to discuss its place in state governance, there is 
the potential to continue the work done pre-same-sex 
marriage. Creating this space could allow for meaning-
ful discussions about what constitutes “family” and to 
recognize that, like our familial networks, both queer 
theory scholarship and Canadian law could be more 
flexible. Contrary to what the critics say, these two steps 
back could actually be one giant leap forward.
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